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In  this  paper  we  use  data  on  five  social  inclusion  indicators  (poverty,  inequality, 
unemployment,  education and health) to assess  and compare the performance of 27 
European  welfare  states  (EU27)  in  2008.  Aggregate  measures  of  performance  are 
obtained using index number methods similar to those employed in the construction of 
the widely used Human Development Index (HDI). These are compared with alternative 
measures derived from data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods. We are particularly 
interested by the comparison between EU15 and the 12 newcomers (EU12). As it will 
appear among the newcomers some countries are ranking among the top performers and 
others are relegated in the bottom of the ranking.  
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In 2004, the European Union then comprising 15 member states (EU15) experienced an 
enlargement of eight Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), plus the Mediterranean islands of 
Malta and Cyprus. This was the largest single enlargement in terms of people, landmass 
and number of countries, though not in terms of GDP. The less developed nature of 
these countries was of concern to some of the older member states. In 2007 two other 
Eastern European countries, Romania and Bulgaria, joined the EU now consisting of 27 
members (EU27), thus adding to a widespread concern of impoverishment of the Union. 
In this paper we want to see how these 12 newcomers (EU12) fare in terms of social 
protection. Are they much different than the older member states? Do they pursue the 
same objectives of traditional European Welfare states, namely poverty alleviation and 
protection  against  life-cycle  risks  such  as  unemployment,  ill  health  and  lack  of 
education? 
Thanks to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC, herafter)
2, a variety of comparable 
and  regularly  updated  indicators  have  been  developed  for  the  appraisal  of  social 
protection  policies.  For  EU15  we  already  have  a  series  of  12  years  but  for  the 
newcomers the series is limited to a few years, the most recent. In this paper we focus 
our attention on five of the most commonly used indicators, which relate to poverty, 
inequality,  unemployment,  education  and  health.  The  first  four  indicators  poverty 
(POV), inequality  (INE), unemployment (UNE) and early school leavers (EDU)  are 
such that we want them as low as possible, while life expectancy (EXP) is the only 
"positive" indicator. 
The definitions of the indicators that we use are presented in Table 1. Furthermore, the 
values of these indicators for 27 European member states are listed in Table A1 in the 
Appendix for the year 2008. This paper can be viewed as an extension of Coelli et al. 
(2010) in which we study the performance of social protection in EU15 over the period 
1995-2006. Here we follow the same methodology but because the period is too short 
we cannot check whether or not performance scores converge. In Coelli et al. we were 
able to show some catching up.  
The key question is that of aggregation. As one sees from Table A1 countries are not 
good or bad in all respects. In other words, when comparing country A with country B, 
we are unable to confidently say that A is doing better than B unless all five indicators in 
country A are better than (or equal to) those in country B. To address this issue we need 
to use an aggregate indicator of social protection. Perhaps we could use methods similar 
to those used in constructing the widely used Human Development Indicator (HDI)?
3  
That index involves the scaling of its three composite indicators (education, health and 
income) so that they lie between zero and one, where the bounds are  set to reflect 
                                                            
2 The open method of coordination is a process where explicit, clear and mutually agreed objectives are defined, after 
which peer review enables Member States to examine and learn from the best practice in Europe. Commonly agreed 
upon indicators allow each member state to find out where it stands. The exchange of information is designed with 
the aim of institutionalizing policy mimicking (see Pochet, 2005). 
3 See Anand and Sen (1994). Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
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minimum and maximum targets selected by the authors. The HDI is then constructed as 
an equal weighted sum of these three scaled indicators. 
 
Table 1: Indicators of Exclusion: - Definitions  
Definition 
   
POV :  At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers as defined as the share of 
persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-
poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median 
equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). 
   
INE :  Inequality of income distribution as defined as the ratio of total 
income received by the 20% of the population with the highest 
income (top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the population 
with the lowest income (lowest quintile). Income must be understood 
as equivalised disposable income. 
   
UNE :  Long term unemployed (12 months or longer) as a share of the total 
active population harmonised with national monthly unemployment 
estimates. 
   
EDU :  Early school leavers as the percentage of the population aged 18-24 
with at most lower secondary education and not in further education 
or training. 
   
EXP :  Life expectancy as the number of years a person may be expected to 
live, starting at age 0. 




In this paper we also wish to construct an aggregate index of social protection, so that 
we can address questions such as “Is country A doing better than country B?” Various 
choices need to be made regarding the methods we use. First, should we use a linear 
aggregation function as is used in the HDI?  Second, how should we scale our indicators 
– especially those indicators where a higher value is bad (e.g., unemployment)?  Third, Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
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should we allocate equal weights to each of the five indicators?
4  If not, how should we 
determine the weights?  Should it be based on a survey of experts, as was done in the 
World Health Organisation health system efficiency project (see WHO, 2000) or could 
some  form  of  econometric  technique  be  used?    Fourth,  should  we  insist  that  all 
countries have the same set of weights or should we allow them to differ so as to reflect 
different priorities in different countries (for example, see the analysis of the WHO data 
by Lauer et al., 2004)?
5  Fifth, should we include an input measure, such as government 
expenditure as a share of GDP on these activities, so as to produce a measure of the 
efficiency of the social protection system instead of just an output index? 
The prime objective of our paper is to go beyond the indeterminacy that is implicit (and 
voluntarily so) to the OMC and to provide a single index reflecting the performance of 
European welfare states. Such an index allows us to make performance comparisons 
across countries and over time. 
The question one can raise at this point is that of the relevancy of our partial indicators 
and thus of our single index as a measure of the performance of the welfare state. This 
brings us back to the performance approach, according to which the performance of an 
organisation or of a production unit is defined by the extent to which it achieves the 
objectives that it is expected to fulfil. In the case of the welfare state, the common view 
is that it has two main missions: to protect individuals against lifetime risks such as 
unemployment, sickness, disability, etc. and to alleviate all forms of poverty. Ideally, to 
check the contribution of the welfare state to the fulfilment of these two missions, one 
should be able to compute the level of social welfare with and without the welfare state. 
Namely,  with  and  without  the  various  tax-transfer  policies  that  are  part  of  social 
protection and the numerous protective regulations of modern welfare states. Needless 
to say, such an endeavour is, at this point, unrealistic for reasons of methodology and 
data availability. One thus has to resort to imperfect tools to measure the level of social 
well-being and the contribution of the welfare state to that level. 
The five indicators we are using here cover the most relevant concerns of a modern 
welfare state; they also reflect aspects that people who want to enlarge the concept of 
GDP  to  better  measure  social  welfare  generally  take  into  account.
6  Their  choice  is 
determined by the objectives of the welfare state and, in that respect, they are not as 
comprehensive as would be considered if one was to attempt to measure social welfare. 
For  example,  we  do  not  include  a  measure  of  average  income  or  an  indicator  of 
environmental quality. 
We assume that these five partial indicators as well as the aggregate indicator measure 
the actual outcomes of the welfare state, what we call its performance. It would be 
interesting to also measure the true contribution of the welfare state to that performance 
and hence to evaluate to what extent the welfare state, with its financial and regulatory 
means, gets close to the best practice frontier. We argue that this exercise, which in 
                                                            
4 The issues of weights and scaling are of course related. 
5 One could also allow the weights to vary across time periods. 
6 See, e.g., the classical measurable economic welfare (MEW) developed by Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) and more 
recently the Stiglitz report (Stiglitz et al.(2009)). Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
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production  theory  amounts  to  the  measurement  of  productive  efficiency,  is  highly 
questionable at this level of aggregation. 
In this paper we focus on the measurement of performance of 27 welfare states in the 
most recent year. At this point, two words of caution are in order. They concern the 
scope of our exercise and the quality of data. When we compare the performance of the 
welfare state across countries we do not intend to explain it by the social programs 
comprising the welfare state. We realize that many factors may explain differences in 
performance. First the welfare state is not restricted to spending but includes also a 
battery of regulatory measures that contribute to protect people against lifetime risks 
and to alleviate poverty. Second contextual factors such as family structure, culture and 
climate, may explain educational or health outcomes as much as anything else. This is 
why we limit our exercise to what we call performance assessment and argue against the 
extension to efficiency analysis. 
The second word of caution concerns the data we use. They are provided by the EU 
member states within the OMC. They deal with key dimensions of individual well-
being; and are comparable across countries. It is difficult to find better data for the 
purpose at hand. This being said, we realize that they can be perfected. There is some 
discontinuity in the series of inequality and poverty indicators. In addition, one could 
argue that life expectancy in good health is likely to be preferred to life expectancy at 
birth or an absolute measure of poverty might be better than a relative measure that is 
too closely related to income inequality. But for the time being, these alternatives do not 
exist. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  In  the  next  section  we  assess  the 
performance  of  27  European  welfare  states  for  the  most  recent  year,  2008,  using  a 
number of social indicators.  This involves the construction of an aggregate measure 
using a similar methodology as that used in the HDI.  In section 3 we use a frontier 
measurement  technique  known  as  data  envelopment  analysis  (DEA)  to  construct  an 
alternative  aggregate  measure,  which  allows  weights  to  differ  across  countries.    In 
section  4  we  discuss  the  issue  of  performance  measurement  versus  efficiency 
measurement. A final section provides some concluding comments. 
2.  Constructing an Aggregate Social Protection Index 
We have selected five indicators among those provided by Eurostat. Our selection was 
based on two concerns: choosing the most relevant data and making sure that they cover 
the  27  countries.  The  indicators  given  in  Table  1  reflect  different  facets  of  social 
exclusion.  
The five indicators listed in Table 1 are measured in different units. Can we normalize 
them  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  comparable?    The  original  Human  Development 
Report (HDR, 1990) suggested that the n-th indicator (e.g., life expectancy) of the i-th 
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so that for each indicator the highest score is one and the lowest is zero. For “negative” 
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so that the country with the lowest rate of unemployment will receive a score of one and 
the one with the highest rate of unemployment will receive zero. 
Table 2 shows the normalized partial indicators of social performance for our sample 
of 27 countries. It is interesting to see the situation of the twelve newcomers compared 
to  the  EU15.  Though  Poland  is  the  best  performing  country  in  terms  of  education, 
Slovakia and Slovenia performs well in terms of inequality while Czech Republic has 
also a maximum score for both inequality and poverty. Italy and Denmark are the best 
in terms of life expectancy  and unemployment  respectively.  Looking at the bottom, 
Portugal  has  the  worst  results  for  the  EU15  but  Latvia  is  doing  quite  bad  for  both 
inequality and poverty. 
How can we aggregate these five scaled indicators to obtain an overall assessment of 
social protection performance?  One option is to again follow the HDI method and 











ni i x SPI .  (3) 
This has been done and the values obtained are reported in column 7 of Table 2. As it 
appears, we have at the top the Nordic countries, plus Austria, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. But we also have new entrants countries doing quite well like Slovenia or 
Czech Republic which are at the top. At the bottom, we find Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Portugal. 
We can also look at the evolution over the period 2005-2008. This is much too short 
to draw any conclusion as to convergence of performance. On Figure 1, we observe that 
some countries have decreasing trends in their SPI for the 4 years. This is the case of 
Bulgaria or Romania but also of Germany. Hopefully in 10 years from now robust tests 
of convergence will be possible.  
 
 
                                                            
7 The acronym, SPI, refers to social protection index.  Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
7 
Table 2: Normalized Scores and Social Protection Index, EU27 - 2008 
  POV  INE  UNE  EDU  EXP  SPI  Rank 
EU15 AUT  0.824  0.923  0.934  0.850  0.896  0.901  2 
          BEL  0.647  0.821  0.541  0.794  0.838  0.748  12 
          DEU  0.647  0.641  0.459  0.800  0.851  0.688  14 
          DNK  0.824  0.949  1.000  0.809  0.704  0.865  7 
          ESP  0.353  0.487  0.754  0.209  0.953  0.601  18 
          FIN  0.706  0.897  0.885  0.859  0.822  0.866  5 
          FRA  0.765  0.795  0.607  0.800  0.976  0.794  10 
          GBR  0.412  0.436  0.852  0.647  0.836  0.693  13 
          GRC  0.353  0.359  0.492  0.712  0.831  0.598  19 
          IRL  0.588  0.718  0.803  0.815  0.824  0.790  11 
          ITA  0.412  0.564  0.574  0.568  1.000  0.676  15 
          LUX  0.765  0.821  0.820  0.753  0.904  0.824  8 
          NLD  0.882  0.846  0.918  0.812  0.887  0.866  6 
          PRT  0.471  0.308  0.475  0.106  0.767  0.414  25 
          SWE  0.824  0.974  0.951  0.821  0.961  0.927  1 
               
EU12 BGR  0.294  0.205  0.607  0.712  0.143  0.417  24 
          CYP  0.588  0.821  1.000  0.744  0.911  0.869  4 
          CZE  1.000  1.000  0.721  0.982  0.555  0.815  9 
          EST  0.412  0.590  0.803  0.735  0.240  0.592  20 
          HUN  0.824  0.949  0.492  0.803  0.230  0.618  17 
          LTU  0.353  0.359  0.885  0.929  0.000  0.543  23 
          LVA  0.000  0.000  0.770  0.691  0.053  0.379  27 
          MLT  0.647  0.846  0.672  0.000  0.804  0.580  21 
          POL  0.529  0.564  0.689  1.000  0.381  0.658  16 
          ROM  0.176  0.077  0.689  0.679  0.149  0.398  26 
          SVK  0.882  1.000  0.000  0.971  0.307  0.569  22 
          SVN  0.824  1.000  0.770  0.997  0.743  0.878  3 
Mean EU 15  0.631  0.703  0.738  0.690  0.870  0.750   
Mean EU 12  0.544  0.618  0.675  0.770  0.376  0.610   
Mean EU 27  0.593  0.665  0.710  0.726  0.651  0.688   Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
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3.  Data Envelopment Analysis 
The above index construction method described in the previous section uses implicit 
weights that one could argue are rather arbitrary. One possible solution to this problem 
is the use of the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method.
8  DEA is traditionally used 
to measure the technical efficiency scores of a sample of firms. For example, in the case 
of agriculture, one would collect data on the inputs and outputs of a sample of farms. 
Output  variables  could  be  wheat  and  beef,  while  the  input  variables  could  be  land, 
labour, capital, materials and services. The DEA method involves running a sequence of 
linear programs which fit a production frontier surface over the data points, defined by a 
collection  of  intersecting  hyper-planes.  The  DEA  method  produces  a  technical 
efficiency score for each firm in the sample. This is a value between zero and one which 
reflects the degree to which the firm is near the frontier. A value of one indicates that 
the firm is on the frontier and is fully efficient, while a value of 0.8 indicates that the 
firm is producing 80% of its potential output given the input vector it has.
9   
In the case of the production of social protection, we could conceptualise a production 
process where each country is a “firm” which uses government resources to produce 
social outputs such as reduced unemployment and longer life expectancies. At this stage 
                                                            
8 For example, see Coelli et al. (2005) for details of the DEA method. See also Cherchye et al. (2004) who use the 
DEA in a setting close to this one. 
9 This is known as an output orientated efficiency score. It reflects the degree to which the output vector of the i-th 
firm can be proportionally expanded (with inputs fixed) while still remaining within the feasible production set 
defined by the DEA frontier. One can also define input orientated technical efficiency scores, which relate to the 
degree to which inputs can be contracted (with outputs fixed). Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
9 
of the paper we will assume that each country has one “government” and hence one unit 
of input, and it produces the five outputs discussed above.
10   
 
Table 3: Performance scores and ranks, EU27 - 2008 
  SPI    DEA    DEA-I   
  Scores  rank  Scores  rank  Scores  rank 
EU15 AUT  0.885  2  1.000  1  0.770  20 
          BEL  0.728  12  0.921  19  0.691  27 
          DEU  0.680  13  0.931  17  0.702  25 
          DNK  0.857  5  1.000  1  0.712  23 
          ESP  0.551  21  0.973  14  0.980  10 
          FIN  0.834  7  0.978  13  0.801  16 
          FRA  0.788  10  1.000  1  0.739  21 
          GBR  0.637  15  0.883  20  0.714  22 
          GRC  0.549  22  0.866  21  0.708  24 
          IRL  0.750  11  0.927  18  1.000  1 
          ITA  0.623  18  1.000  1  0.828  14 
          LUX  0.812  9  0.938  16  0.989  9 
          NLD  0.869  3  1.000  1  0.823  15 
          PRT  0.425  24  0.778  25  0.696  26 
          SWE  0.906  1  1.000  1  0.771  19 
             
EU12 BGR  0.392  25  0.737  27  0.788  17 
          CYP  0.813  8  1.000  1  1.000  1 
          CZE  0.852  6  1.000  1  1.000  1 
          EST  0.556  20  0.850  23  1.000  1 
          HUN  0.659  14  0.949  15  0.776  18 
          LTU  0.505  23  1.000  1  1.000  1 
          LVA  0.303  27  0.807  24  1.000  1 
          MLT  0.594  19  0.865  22  1.000  1 
          POL  0.633  16  1.000  1  0.949  12 
          ROM  0.354  26  0.755  26  0.858  13 
          SVK  0.632  17  1.000  1  1.000  1 
          SVN  0.867  4  1.000  1  0.954  11 
Mean EU15 
EEEU15 
0.750    0.946    0.795   
Mean EU12  0.610    0.914    0.944   
Mean EU27  0.688    0.932    0.861   
 
The  DEA  efficiency  score  are  reported  in  column  4  of  Table  3.  A  number  of 
observations can be made. First, we note that approximately 40% of the sample receives 
                                                            
10 Later in this paper we look at the possibility of measuring the input using government expenditure measures. Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
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a DEA efficiency score of one (indicating that they are fully efficient).  This is not 
unusual in a DEA analysis where the number of dimensions (variables) is large relative 
to the number of observations.  Second, the mean DEA score is 0.93 versus the mean 
SPI  score  of  0.67.  The  DEA  scores  tend  to  be  higher  because  they  are  relative  to 
observed best practice, while the SPI scores are relative to an “ideal” case where all 
scaled indicators equal one. Third, the DEA rankings are “broadly similar” to the index 
number rankings.  However a few countries do experience large changes, such as Italy 
and Lituania which are ranked 18 and 23 respectively in the index numbers but are 
found to be fully efficient in the DEA results.
11   
Why  do  we  observe  differences  between  the  rankings  in  DEA  versus  the  index 
numbers?  There are two primary reasons. First, the index numbers allocate an equal 
weight of 1/5 to each indicator while in the DEA method the weights used can vary 
across the five indicators because they are determined by the slope of the production 
possibility  frontier  that  is  constructed  using  the  LP  methods.  Second,  the  implicit 
weights (or shadow prices) in DEA can also vary from country to country because the 
slope of the frontier can differ for different output (indicator) mixes.  
To investigate this issue, we have used the shadow price information from the dual 
DEA LP to obtain implicit price weights for each country.  The means of these weights 
are given on Table 4.  The first thing we note is that the scaled poverty and inequality 
indicators are given a fairly small weight in the DEA models, while the health indicator 
is given a weight much larger than 0.3  These results suggest that the uniform weights 
of 0.2 (used in the SPI) understate the effort needed to improve education and health 
outcomes  versus  reducing  inequality  and  poverty.  This  may  be  because  health  and 
reducation outcomes are quite uniformly high amongst this group of countries, while 
inequality levels vary quite a bit, especially when one compares Northern Europe with 
the rest.  Thus, getting a unit change in health or education outcomes is likely to involve 
a lot of effort relative to these other indicators.
12 
Table 4: Means of the DEA implicit weights, EU27 
  POV  INE  UNE  EDU  EXP 
EU15  0.035  0.149  0.222  0.291  0.303 
EU12  0.000  0.348  0.257  0.307  0.089 
EU27  0.043  0.154  0.214  0.276  0.313 
 
                                                            
11 The favourable DEA score for Italy is due primarily to the fact that it has the best life expectancy score in the 
sample, which puts it at the edge of the five-dimensional data space and hence gives it a higher likelihood of being 
found to be efficient because of the convexity of the DEA frontier. Similarly, Lituania has very good indicators of 
education and unemployment. 
12 Two weighting methods are described that involve either setting all weights to 0.2, versus using the shadow prices 
derived from the DEA frontier to set them.  A third option is to use “weights restricted DEA” which allows the 
weights to be selected within pre-set bounds.  This method is a “mix” of these two ideas, and is useful if one has 
strong views regarding the upper and lower bounds that should apply to one or more of these weights.  For more on 
weights restricted DEA methods, see Allen et al (1997).  Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
11 
4.  Measuring efficiency with or without inputs 
In traditional measures of production efficiency of public services or public utilities, we 
gather data on both outputs and inputs and construct a best practice frontier using either 
a parametric (regression) or non-parametric (e.g., DEA) technique. So doing we are able 
to say that if a production unit has a certain degree of inefficiency, it means that it can 
do better with the same quantity of inputs or do as well with less inputs. This approach 
is very useful and should be used to assess the efficiency of the public sector under two 
key conditions: availability of data and the existence of an underlying technology. For 
example,  measuring  the  efficiency  of  railways  companies  with  this  approach  makes 
sense.  Railways  transport  people  and  commodities  (hopefully  with  comfort  and 
punctuality) using a certain number of identifiable inputs. 
When dealing with the public sector as a whole and more particularly social protection, 
one can easily identify its missions: social inclusion in terms of housing, education, 
health, work and consumption. Yet, it is difficult to relate indicators pertaining to these 
missions (e.g., our five indicators) to specific inputs. A number of papers
13 use social 
spending as the input, but one has to realize that for most indicators of inclusion, social 
spending explains little. For example, it is well known that for health and education 
factors such as diet and family support are often just as important as public spending. 
This does not mean that public spending in health and in education is worth nothing; it 
just means that it is part of a complex process in which other factors play a crucial and 
complementary role. 
In column 6 of Table 3, we present the DEA measures using social spending as an input 
(DEA-I).
14  The  results  are  not  surprising.  Countries  that  spend  little  and  had  a  low 
performance now become the most efficient. This is the case of Estonia, Ireland and 
Latvia. Can we conclude that by spending differently Germany or France would do 
better? Not necessarily. Doing better can be related to matters independent from social 
programs:  a  better  diet,  a  less  stressful  life,  an  increased  parental  investment  in 
education, a more flexible labour market, … For these matters there might be room for 
public action but not in financial terms.  
Does that mean that the financing side does not matter? Not really. It is important to 
make  sure  that  wastes  are  minimized,  but  wastes  cannot  be  measured  at  such  an 
aggregate level. It is difficult to think of a well-defined technology which “produces” 
social indicators with inputs. As a consequence, indicators such as DEA-I presented in 
Table 3, can lead to erroneous conclusions. To evaluate the efficiency slacks of the 
public sector, it is desirable to analyse micro-components of the welfare states such as 
schools, hospitals, public agencies, public institution, railways, etc.
15 
16 At the macro 
level, one should stop short of measuring technical inefficiency and restrict oneself to 
performance ranking. 
                                                            
13  Afonso et al. (2006, 2005a,b). 
14  See Table A2 in the appendix for data on social expenditure by country in 2008. 
15 For example, see Pestieau and Tulkens (1993). 
16  See Ravaillon (2005) for discussion of this issue. Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
12 
To again use the analogy of a classroom, it makes sense to rank students according to 
how they perform in a series of exams. Admittedly one can question the quality of tests 
or the weights used in adding marks from different fields. Yet in general there is little 
discussion as to the grading of students. At the same time we know that these students 
may face different “environmental conditions” which can affect their ability to perform.. 
For example, if we have two students ranked number 1 and 2 and if the latter is forced 
to work at night to help ailing parents or to commute a long way from home, it is 
possible that he can be considered as more deserving or meritorious than the number 1 
whose material and family conditions are ideal. This being said there exists no ranking 
of students according to merit. The concept of “merit” is indeed too controversial. By 
the same token, we should not use social spending as an indicator of the “merit” of 
social protection systems. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  was  to  present  some  guidelines  as  to  the  question  of 
measuring the performance of social protection. We believe that such measurement is 
unavoidable  for two reasons. First, people  constantly  compare welfare states on the 
basis  of  questionable  indicators.  Second,  a  good  measure  can  induce  national 
governments that are not well ranked to get closer to the best practice frontier. This is 
the spirit of the European OMC (Open Method of Coordination) that has lead to the 
annual publication of indicators of social inclusion for the EU member countries. 
In this paper we propose two approaches: one based on a simple average of partial 
indicators and the other based on Data Envelopment Analysis. The advantage of DEA is 
to provide flexible and endogenous weights for our inclusion indicators. Another issue 
we deal with is that of normalization. DEA scores look higher because they are relative 
to observed best practices and not to a theoretical benchmark like the index numbers.  
We then discuss whether or not we have to limit ourselves to a simple performance 
comparison or we can conduct an efficiency study. Even though we realize that our 
performance  measures  depend  on  the  resources  invested  by  the  state  to  finance 
alternative social protection programs, we deliberately restrict ourselves to performance 
comparison and argue against the calculation of efficiency measures as it is usually 
done for micro-units. The reason is simple: the link between public spending and most 
of our social inclusion indicators is not clear and does not reveal a clear-cut production 
technology.  More  concretely,  factors  that  can  affect  performance  are  missing.  For 
example, climate can affect health and social attitudes can affect education. 
The fact that even with an enlarged measure of social inclusion the Nordic countries 
lead  the  pack  is  not  surprising.  It  is  neither  surprising  to  see  that  Mediterranean 
countries are not doing well. What is surprising is to see that with such an enlarged 
concept Anglo-Saxon welfare states do as well as the Continental welfare states such as 
Germany and France. Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
13 
As a final comment, let us come back to the selection of social inclusion indicators. The 
gist of this paper is to measure the performance of social protection on the basis of its 
two main objectives: poverty and inequality reduction and protection against lifetime 
risks. If there were no problem with data availability, the indicators we would like to 
use would primarily concern the distribution of individual welfare over the lifecycle and 
across  individuals.  That  ideal  measure  of  welfare  would  include  consumption, 
education, health and employment. Unfortunately, such evidence does not exist for the 
EU15  over  a  sufficiently  long  period.  As  a  consequence,  we  have  relied  upon  the 
indicators made available in the framework of the OMC. 
 Welfare State Performance in the EU. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Social protection indicators - 2008 
 
EDU  INE  EXP  UNE  POV 
AUT  10.1  3.7  80.6  0.9  12 
BEL  12.0  4.1  80.1  3.3  15 
BGR  14.8  6.5  73.3  2.9  21 
CYP  13.7  4.1  80.8  0.5  16 
CZE  5.6  3.4  77.3  2.2  9 
DEU  11.8  4.8  80.2  3.8  15 
DNK  11.5  3.6  78.8  0.5  12 
ESP  31.9  5.4  81.2  2.0  20 
EST  14.0  5.0  74.3  1.7  19 
FIN  9.8  3.8  79.9  1.2  14 
FRA  11.8  4.2  81.4  2.9  13 
GBR  17.0  5.6  80.0  1.4  19 
GRC  14.8  5.9  80.0  3.6  20 
HUN  11.7  3.6  74.2  3.6  12 
IRL  11.3  4.5  79.9  1.7  16 
ITA  19.7  5.1  81.6  3.1  19 
LTU  7.4  5.9  72.0  1.2  20 
LUX  13.4  4.1  80.7  1.6  13 
LVA  15.5  7.3  72.5  1.9  26 
MLT  39.0  4.0  79.7  2.5  15 
NLD  11.4  4.0  80.5  1.0  11 
POL  5.0  5.1  75.6  2.4  17 
PRT  35.4  6.1  79.4  3.7  18 
ROM  15.9  7.0  73.4  2.4  23 
SVK  6.0  3.4  74.9  6.6  11 
SVN  5.1  3.4  79.1  1.9  12 
SWE  11.1  3.5  81.3  0.8  12 
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Table A2: Social protection spending as a share of GDP - 2008 
  % of GDP 
AUT  27.1 
BEL  28.0 
BGR  14.6 
CYP  18.1 
CZE  18.0 
DEU  26.7 
DNK  28.1 
ESP  20.5 
EST  12.3 
FIN  24.6 
FRA  29.0 
GBR  24.8 
GRC  23.8 
HUN  21.9 
IRL  17.6 
ITA  25.5 
LTU  13.9 
LUX  19.0 
LVA  10.7 
MLT  17.9 
NLD  26.8 
POL  17.8 
PRT  23.4 
ROM  12.6 
SVK  15.4 
SVN  20.8 
SWE  29.0 
 